Two defects that only surface against the real DeepSeek API, both of which break the cost model rather than the code: deepseek-v4-flash enables thinking mode by default. The same single-turn question took 13.5s with it on and 1.8s with it off, and the thinking tokens are billed at the output rate. That misses NFR-PERF-02b (15s per turn) and inflates every conversational call. SceneConfig now carries an explicit `thinking` flag, all four V1 scenes set it to false, and the provider always sends the parameter rather than relying on the upstream default. Reasoning tokens are recorded separately in Usage.tokens_reasoning so the cost of ever turning it back on is visible. DeepSeek moves to peak/off-peak pricing on 2026-08-17, with peak (Beijing 09:00-12:00 and 14:00-18:00) at twice the off-peak rate. Reports are generated mostly during peak hours, so a single blended rate would leave ob_ai_call -- the only input to V2 pricing -- off by nearly a factor of two. PeakAwareRateTable resolves the rate at call time; cost is computed and stored then, never recomputed later at whatever the current rate happens to be. Also here: - Replace the live API key in the redaction test with a synthetic one. The test that proves we redact secrets was itself a secret leak waiting for its first commit. - Correct LLM_COST_RATES_JSON, which held placeholder rates. - Make ids.SnowflakeGenerator take an injectable clock so rollover and clock-rollback are testable without patching a slots class. - Rename exceptions to the -Error suffix (N818) and clear the remaining ruff, mypy and import-linter findings, including two dead lines: a duplicate pytestmark assignment and a no-op assert on a None return. Gates: ruff, mypy (96 files incl. tests), 4/4 import contracts, detect-secrets, 166 unit + 3 integration tests, migration up/down round-trip.
77 lines
1.9 KiB
Python
Executable File
77 lines
1.9 KiB
Python
Executable File
"""JWT access tokens (架构文档 §9.1: Bearer JWT, 15 分钟).
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The revocable refresh-token half (`id_session`) is FR-ACC-05 and is deliberately
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NOT implemented in this scaffold — see packages/identity/README.md.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import time
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from typing import Any
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import jwt
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from packages.shared.errors import AppError, ErrorCode
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@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
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class AccessTokenClaims:
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user_id: int
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issued_at: int
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expires_at: int
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issuer: str
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def create_access_token(
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*,
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user_id: int,
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secret: str,
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algorithm: str = "HS256",
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ttl_seconds: int = 900,
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issuer: str = "meida",
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now: int | None = None,
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) -> str:
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issued_at = int(now if now is not None else time.time())
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payload: dict[str, Any] = {
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"sub": str(user_id),
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"iat": issued_at,
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"exp": issued_at + ttl_seconds,
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"iss": issuer,
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"typ": "access",
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}
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return str(jwt.encode(payload, secret, algorithm=algorithm))
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def decode_access_token(
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token: str,
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*,
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secret: str,
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algorithm: str = "HS256",
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issuer: str = "meida",
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) -> AccessTokenClaims:
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try:
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payload = jwt.decode(
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token,
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secret,
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algorithms=[algorithm],
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issuer=issuer,
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options={"require": ["exp", "iat", "sub"]},
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)
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except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError as exc:
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raise AppError(ErrorCode.TOKEN_EXPIRED) from exc
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except jwt.InvalidTokenError as exc:
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raise AppError(ErrorCode.TOKEN_INVALID) from exc
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try:
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user_id = int(payload["sub"])
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except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
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raise AppError(ErrorCode.TOKEN_INVALID) from exc
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return AccessTokenClaims(
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user_id=user_id,
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issued_at=int(payload["iat"]),
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expires_at=int(payload["exp"]),
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issuer=str(payload.get("iss", issuer)),
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)
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